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Abstract:  
In this paper, we examine the impact of technology licensing-in on firm invention performance. 
Studying a sample of 266 licensees and matched non-licensees using a two-part model 
specification, we find that licensees are more likely to introduce inventions than their non-licensee 
counterparts. This holds both if we consider invention in general, and invention in the licensed 
technological class only. We also show that familiarity with the licensed technology and 
technological specialization drives licensees to pursue a narrow invention strategy primarily 
focusing on the technological class specified in the license agreement.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Technology licensing is becoming an increasingly popular instrument for firms to tap 
into other organizations’ research outcomes. External knowledge licensing gives firms 
access to technologies that help to fill gaps, reveal blind spots (Chesbrough 2003), and 
complement internal capabilities, enhancing a firm’s development over time (Tsai and Wang 
2007). That firms license in technologies directly goes against what Katz and Allen (1982) 
referred to as the “not invented here” syndrome. Licensing-in indeed indicates that firms do 
not suffer from this syndrome by embraces the inventiveness of external agents. However, 
despite increasing anecdotal evidence,1 the potential of licensing-in in terms of fuelling firms’ 
innovation funnel has been poorly acknowledged (Chesbrough 2003). 
Technology licensing has enhanced inter-connectivity, propelled knowledge 
dispersion, reduced the costs of accessing potentially valuable external knowledge and, 
thus, produced new possibilities for accessing and using the knowledge residing in other 
firms, communities, and external individuals (Chesbrough 2003; Granstrand et al. 1992; 
Narula 2001). While this opens up new opportunities to enable continuous matching of 
strategic industry factors with a wider set of resources, it also poses new challenges for 
management in terms of efficient integration, combination, and exploitation of internal and 
external knowledge (Cassiman and Veugelers 2006).   
The literature on licensing enhances our understanding of the determinants and 
conditions favoring the decision to license-out (e.g. Fosfuri 2006; Kim and Vonortas 2006). 
However, to our knowledge, the strategic and economic rationales for licensing-in practices 
have not been explored. Also, the role played by licensing-in as a principal component of the 
firm’s invention strategy has generally been overlooked. An exception is the work by Tsai 
and Wang (2007: 152) who suggest that “by inward technology licensing, the firm may 
accumulate its technological knowledge and strengthen its technological capabilities from 
the search and use of external technology”. They investigate firm performance, showing that 
firms that enter into licensing agreements as licensees, and combine this with internal 
research and development (R&D) activities, show high value added. Their study 
underscores the importance of exploring the role of licensing as a promoter of firm invention 
performance. There is a clear need for studying how licensing shapes organizations and 
their performance.   
                                                 
1 There are several business examples that point to this trend. For instance, in 2004, PPOL Inc., a California-
based holding company that sells proprietary multi-functional telecommunications equipment and runs the on-
line network service, Pan Pacific Online, announced its new growth strategy focused on in-licensing of proven 
and promising technologies. According to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer “this growth strategy 
leverages our significant technology expertise and robust core business in Japan to maximize shareholder value” 
(see Form 8K, ex-99.1 “Miscellaneous Exhibit” filed on 2nd April 2004, available online at 
http://www.secinfo.com/d11MXs.1965.d.htm, accessed January 2008.) 
Building on the previous insights, this paper explores the extent to which licensing-in 
influences the licensee’s inventive performance ex post. Drawing on the Open Innovation 
Approach and the Dynamic Capabilities Perspective – which together provide a framework 
for understanding competitive advantage as being based on the joint exploitation and 
creation of internal and external firm-specific capabilities (Chesbrough 2006; Teece 2008; 
Teece et al. 1997) – we test empirically for whether licensing-in of external technologies 
impacts on the firm’s rate of inventiveness. Our argument is that licensing-in enables 
knowledge re-combination and the development of dynamic capabilities and absorptive 
capacity, producing novel technological advances. The overall findings from our econometric 
analysis suggest that there is a licensing-effect that empowers the inventive endeavors of 
licensees. The effect is twofold. First, licensing increases the chances and extent of 
invention in general. Second, licensing promotes spill-over and learning effects that are 
beneficial to firm’s invention activities related to the technological class specified in the 
license agreement. Additionally, our analysis indicates that particular characteristics of 
licensees act as antecedents causing them to adopt a narrowly defined invention pattern 
specified by the licensed technology. Specifically, licensees that are technologically 
specialized and familiar with the licensed patents center their technological achievements 
around the technological classes included in the license agreement.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the hypotheses, 
building on insights from the literature on licensing, re-interpreted through the lens of the 
open innovation approach and the dynamic capabilities perspective. This is followed by a 
method and data section that describes in depth the matching procedure adopted to develop 
the control sample of non-licensees. We present our dataset of 266 observations, including 
133 licensee firms (treatment sample) and 133 non-licensing firms (control sample) and 
discuss the econometric techniques employed. In the results section we present our 
findings. The paper concludes by discussing the findings and implications of these new 
insights on theory and practice and providing some suggestions for further research. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of this research is to show how technology licensing steers the 
invention performance of firms. Firms have several motives for acquiring technologies from 
other firms (see e.g. Lubatkin 1983). Yet, the technology licensing literature argues that 
licensing is a mechanism employed to get rapid access to a proven/mature technology while 
reducing firms’ financial exposure and time-to-market (Atuahene-Gima 1993; Chatterji 1996; 
Roberts and Berry 1985). In fact, licensing-in is traditionally considered a reaction to a 
technological shortfall in the licensee (Lowe and Taylor 1998). In other words, licensing-in 
generally has been seen as a firm’s tactical response to technological shortcomings. 
However, licensing-in can also be perceived as a way of fostering technological learning - for 
instance, in the form of new patents (Johnson 2002) - by exploiting and developing the 
licensed technology over time. Indeed, licensing-in can be considered an extension of the 
licensee’s R&D activities that guarantees the technological reliability of a technical advance, 
achieved by a third party. From this perspective, licensing-in should be seen as integral to a 
firm’s invention activities rather than a decision to outsource part of its R&D efforts.  
The idea that licensing creates potential learning opportunities is well recognized in 
the literature on technology transfer from developed to developing countries (e.g. Prahalad 
and Hamel 1990). The capacity and predisposition of receiving nations to absorb 
technological knowledge from the outside are principal drivers of this type of learning. In 
order to benefit, recipients need “technological leverage” capabilities that allow them “to 
combine disparate sources in sequential process of organizational learning” (Mathews and 
Cho 1999). Along similar lines, Johnson (2002) investigates the effect of licensing activities - 
past and current – on the rate of patenting in the Brazilian national system. His findings – 
which are at the aggregate level - are intuitive, and suggest that licensees learn “about a 
technology during the licensing period, possibly even developing new patentable technology 
during the license” (Johnson 2002: 175). Thus, he introduces the concept of learning-by-
licensing, capturing the alleged positive effects of licensing on the patenting activity and 
productivity of the licensee.  
Investigating Japanese and English technology licensing at firm-level, Pitkethly (2001) 
warns about the threat to licensors of incautious licensing-out of technology to competitors. 
He emphasizes that licensees may learn from the licensed technology, eventually to the 
detriment of the licensors’ technological lead, providing support for the relevance of learning 
opportunities represented by license agreements. License agreements have been argued to 
be much more than the simple transfer of technology from one firm to another (Anand and 
Khanna 2000; Bessy et al. 2002). The license agreement acts as an instrument that the 
parties can employ to open up a channel through which information and knowledge, either 
voluntarily or inadvertently, can flow, thus providing information beyond what is described in 
the transmitted (patented) documents and creating room for purposeful and accidental 
learning.  
 
License to Invent 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) emphasize that strategic alliances may be motivated 
by both exploration and exploitation. In their investigation of a sample of biotechnology firms, 
they promote licensing, in particular, as an exploitation strategy. Firms enter into license 
agreements in order to bring already existing technological achievements through clinical 
trials, and eventually introduce them onto the market. Broadly speaking, considering 
organizations as problem-solving entities engaging in search and discovery (Cyert and 
March 1963; March and Simon 1958), technology licensing becomes an integrated search 
strategy, which involves the licensee exploring new areas of the technological landscape for 
new inventions by combining internal knowledge with the licensed technology. In this sense, 
the licensed technology can be regarded as an additional input to the firm’s invention 
resources becoming an additional element in the process of exploration that allows firms to 
depart from prior search patterns. It thereby acts as a catalyst that permits the licensee to 
search more broadly (Laursen et al. 2008). A broad search strategy is associated with more 
extensive possibilities of discovering new and potentially lucrative combinations of existing 
technologies (Levinthal and March 1993; March 1991). Thus, licensing-in provides the 
licensee with positive externalities beneficial to the firm’s invention process, by allowing it to 
draw on the knowledge and inventions of others and avoiding investing in the development of 
these technologies from scratch.2  
Hence, technology licensing extends the knowledge base of the licensee providing 
invention benefits through scale. In addition, it broadens the licensee’s invention scope by 
increasing the number of possible recombinations that could produce types of innovation 
(Ahuja and Lampert 2001; Fleming 2001; Henderson and Cockburn 1994). The licensed 
technology empowers the licensee by boosting the knowledge creation process leading to 
the development of inventions. It allows the licensee to savor the benefits of 
complementarities between the licensee firm’s internal knowledge base and the licensed-in 
technology (Veugelers and Cassiman 1999), which, in turn, allows the firm to invent more 
broadly and extensively. This argument is in line with the study by Lowe and Taylor (1998), 
which investigates the role of licensing in the development of new products and processes. 
They argue that there are complementary benefits deriving from the combination of internal 
research, development investment, and inward technology licensing, which increase a firm’s 
invention rate. Lowe and Taylor interpret this as the licensee enjoying capability building 
benefits through its licensing-in activity. In line with this reasoning, we argue that licensing-in 
fosters learning, which, in turn, increases the number of possible recombinations of the 
knowledge available to the firm, thereby boosting the licensee’s invention rate. We can 
formulate the following hypotheses: 
                                                 
2 The markets for technology literature argues that when licensing-in involves patents, it produces stronger 
positive externalities given the liquidity of this form of codified knowledge (e.g. Arora et al. 2001). Patents 
promote spill-over effects attributable to technological knowledge circulation (Arrow 1962; Motohashi 2006; 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991). According to David and Olsen (1992), patents enable the innovation process to 
be speeded up, based on learning-by-doing and, thereby, boosts the diffusion of existing innovations. Patents 
also play the role of hostage in a contract by making the licensor more willing to purposively provide know-how 
to the licensee to allow for a better exploitation of the licensed patents and achieve a better outcome, which is in 
the interests of both parties (Arora 1996). Technology licensing becomes the definitive channel through which 
this diffusion process occurs. 
Hypothesis 1a: Licensees are more likely to introduce inventions. 
Hypothesis 1b: Licensees introduce more inventions. 
 
A License-to-Invent in the Licensed Technology 
There are invention advantages from licensing-in related to an invention strategy 
based on the licensed technological class. Integration of the licensed technology and related 
learning effects may shift the licensee’s technological focus, promoting search in the 
technological class specified in the license agreement. Technology licensing can be 
considered a shift towards or consolidation of that technology, or an adjustment to the 
invention effort into that particular technological field. Technology licensing induces changes 
to, or new search patterns, thereby becoming the means through which licensees develop 
dynamic capabilities. Dynamic capabilities, defined as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build 
and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments” (Teece et al. 1997: 516), are major advances in the licensees’ invention 
expertise in the contractually specified technology. As emphasized by Teece (2008), these 
capabilities encompass the capacity to sense and size up external as well as internal 
opportunities and threats, and the capacity to reconfigure intangible and tangible assets in 
an entrepreneurial fashion, which leads to the achievement of sustainable competitive 
advantage in the business environment. Indeed, Daneels (2002) argues that developing a 
new product involves not only creating the knowledge contributing to the invention, but also 
developing competences that contribute to the firm’s further renewal. Based on this 
reasoning, we argue that by engaging in a licensing agreement, the licensee opens up a 
channel of information from the licensor, which furnishes it with competences that assist in 
the development of new inventions by the licensee, in the same technological class. 
Arguably, licensees retrieve competences that lower the bar to them becoming inventive in 
the technology in question, due to improved understanding and an upgraded ability to build a 
knowledge base in this field of expertise. A license, therefore, enables the creation of 
absorptive capacity (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Cohen and Levinthal 1990), which, in 
Zahra and George’s (2002) conception, is the capability to acquire, assimilate, transform, 
and exploit externally sourced knowledge. Licensing in a technology may redirect these 
capabilities towards the licensed technology, and focus the firm’s invention strategy on this 
particular part of the innovation landscape. Zollo and Winter (2002) develop a theoretical 
framework in which organizational competencies lie along an evolutionary path defined by 
distinctive knowledge accumulation processes that occur over time. Technology plays a 
particular role in this evolution and, according to Teece et al. (1997), conditions the 
dimensions of the path of organizational capabilities. Thus, licensing-in can be considered to 
be one of the processes sustaining dynamic capabilities in action, since it may open up 
pathways to reinforced or even new capabilities within a specific technological domain. We 
argue here, that the license agreement influences this path and assists the licensee to be 
inventive in the licensed technology, which leads to the following two hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 2a: Licensees are more likely to introduce inventions in the technological 
class specified in the license agreement. 
Hypothesis 2b: Licensees introduce more inventions in the technological class 
specified in the license agreement. 
 
Technological Specialization and Post-Licensing Invention Behavior 
While there is good reason to believe that licensing-in promotes firms’ invention 
performance, it also seems clear that particular antecedents shape how licensing promotes 
or inhibits invention. The differences between technologically specialized and diversified 
firms have been closely scrutinized (e.g. Santaló and Becerra 2006; Villalonga 2004). 
Inventive firms are specialized or diversified in patenting activities, depending on whether 
they concentrate on a few technologies or invent more widely. The firm’s specialization may 
be a by-product of the tendency for the firm’s invention practices to be path-dependent in the 
sense that past invention practices dictate the firm’s current and future invention practices 
and constitute boundaries to what the firm might achieve technologically, currently and in the 
future, by delineating its technological trajectory.   
In the context of this paper, we take this argument further by proposing that firms are 
not only locked into a particular technological trajectory in terms of the invention space 
available for opportunity seeking. They also set boundaries to the practices they employ in 
their invention activities. Our arguments fit within the framework proposed by Miller (1993) 
and Miller and Chen (1996), They argue that firms suffer from what they call simplicity, 
defined as the tendency to concentrate intensively on a few central activities. As Miller 
(1993: p. 117) states, there is “an overwhelming preoccupation with a single goal, strategic 
activity, department, of worldview – one that increasingly preclude consideration of any 
other”. Thus, firms find it difficult to strive for multiple goals or achievements. Rather than 
seeing this property of simplicity as common to most organizations, we perceive this pre-
occupational behavior to be an idiosyncrasy that is gradually acquired, such that some firms 
display high levels of simplicity and others do not. In a licensing context, we suggest that 
licensees displaying high levels of simplicity are very likely to draw on this practice ex post of 
signing the license agreement. Technological specialization suggests that the firm 
concentrates intensive invention efforts on a single or few technological classes. Hence, it is 
an indication of the degree to which the organization is characterized by technological 
simplicity. Displaying simplicity prior to licensing activity increases the likelihood that a 
licensee will pursue similar behavior and focus only on a narrowly defined part of the 
innovation landscape. On the other hand, a technologically more specialized licensee, after 
entering into a license agreement, will display an invention behavior that is concentrated 
around the licensed technology . We test the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 3: Licensees with a high degree of technological specialization invent 
more narrowly in the licensed technological class. 
 
Technological Familiarity and Post-Licensing Invention Behavior  
The extant literature on technology transfer (Arora and Gambadella 1990; Cassiman 
and Veugelers 2006; Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Gambadella 1992; Granstrand et al. 1992; 
Lin 2003; Lowe and Taylor 1998; Tsai and Wang 2007) argues that the nature of the 
acquired technology per se is not sufficient to ensure that the recipient firm assimilates and 
integrates it. The extent to which acquisitions of external technological knowledge foster the 
process of technological learning depends on the capabilities of recipient firms to absorb this 
knowledge. Along these lines, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) introduce the concept of firm’s 
relative absorptive capacity, referring to the alliance partners’ abilities to learn from one 
another, based on overlaps in their mutual knowledge bases. Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 
(1998), for instance, find that joint venture partners have significantly higher levels of 
technological overlap than non-partners, suggesting that such overlap - representing a 
relative measure of relatedness among knowledge bases - is a significant factor in the 
partner selection decision.  
In the licensing context, the relevant overlap is between the licensed technology and 
the licensee’s knowledge base. The higher the familiarity – “the degree to which knowledge 
of technology exists within the company, but it is not necessarily embodied in [its] products” 
(Roberts and Berry 1985: 3) - the lower the learning costs associated with the integration of 
the licensed technology. This, in turn, facilitates its fruitful exploitation: the transferred 
technology is more easily mastered by the licensee and can be implemented more quickly 
(Kim and Vonortas 2006).3 However, it also sets boundaries to the extent of technological 
learning. The inventions introduced after licensing-in will be predominantly in the 
technological class embedded in the license agreement. Based on these arguments we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
3 Kim and Vonortas (2006) provide a measure of technological proximity based on the “distance” in the 
“technological space” between licensee and licensor. They suggest that the degree of similarity in the 
technological profile of licensor firm i and licensee firm j in year t increases the probability that licensor firm i 
will license its technology to licensee firm j in year t (Kim and Vonortas 2006: 278). We believe that this proxy 
is misleading when the licensed technology does not reflect the licensor’s core technologies – which is 
frequently the case. While the physical proximity of the licensed parties may lower the transaction costs related 
to the licensing negotiation phase, the overlap between the licensee’s knowledge base and the licensed 
technology is more relevant for the post-licensing integration phase.  
Hypothesis 4: Licensees familiar with the licensed technology prior to licensing-in, 
invent more narrowly within the licensed technological class. 
 
METHOD AND DATA 
This section describes the data and operationalization of the variables, and the 
econometric approach adopted to study the hypotheses.  
 
Data 
We exploit three data sources. First, a sample of patent licensees drawn from an 
extensive cross-sectional data set on intellectual property transactions, organized and 
maintained by the Financial Valuation Group (FVG).4 Apart from providing information on 
licensees, the data provide information about licensors, and time and terms of the 
agreement. The data include a wide range of different types of license agreements such as 
Technology/Patent, Software, Trademark, Franchise, Copyright, and Product licenses. 
However, in the present research we are interested in licenses implying the exchange of 
technology (in the form of patents); this explains our exclusive focus on Technology/Patent 
license agreements. In some cases, information on the licensed patent(s) was not retrievable 
either because the original license agreement was unavailable and not summarized in firm 
filings (e.g. S1, 8K, and 10K) at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or because 
the license agreement was subject to a confidentiality agreement. These agreements are 
excluded from our analysis.  
We integrated the license agreement data with US Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) data drawn from the NBER (National Burea of Economic Research) patent 
database, which allows us to use patent applications as indicators of invention. The NBER 
database is consulted for information on invention and innovation as well as technology 
partnering data. It covers all patents granted by the USPTO up to 2002 and includes a large 
number of key variables useful for the present study (see Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001), 
for a detailed description of the dataset). As this is a patent level database, it includes 
information describing characteristics such as International Patent Classification (IPC) 
classes, date of patent application and grant, number of claims made and number of citations 
made. However, as already stated, the NBER patent database ends in 2002 and some of the 
license agreements studied were signed in 2001. Thus, having identified our total sample, we 
consulted the USPTO patent database search engine to update the NBER dataset to 2008 
for our sample firms.  
                                                 
4 FVG is one of the leading business valuation consulting and litigation service firms in North America, see 
http://www.fvginternational.com/index.html, accessed June 2009.  
 
The primary aim of the paper is to investigate the effect of licensing-in on licensees’ 
post-technology acquisition invention performance. For analytical purposes we redefine the 
question to: “Would licensees find their searches for new inventions less effective had they 
not signed license agreements?” thus creating a setting that points to particular analytical 
methods. Firms are never observed as licensees (treated) and non-licensees (non-treated) 
simultaneously. Our endeavor, therefore, necessitates that we obtain a non-treated sample 
of non-licensees. It is a clear requirement that a control sample useful for comparison, should 
consist of firms that are similar to the group of licensees in the sense of being equally likely 
to have signed similar license agreements, but chose not to do so.  
We relied on a combination of exact and propensity score matching to generate the 
sample of non-licensees. The exact matching procedure ensures that particular 
characteristics of the licensees are duplicated exactly in the control sample. In our case, we 
ensured, first, that the snapshots of licensee and non-licensee were at exactly the same 
point in time, that is, in the same month as the license agreement was signed. Second, we 
checked that licensee and matched non-licensee invent primarily in the same technological 
class, thus ensuring that they will likely compete in the same technology.  
The propensity score matching procedure is based on matching estimated likelihood 
given observables rather than regressors (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). This procedure 
ensures that licensees and the non-licensees are equally likely to have signed license 
agreements given some specified co-variates. One of the advantages of the propensity score 
matching procedure is that it allows the use of multiple continuous regressors to identify a 
matched control sample. In this paper, we rely on a logistic regression method to obtain the 
conditional probability of becoming a licensee given the firm’s specific characteristics. We 
also matched with replacements allowing for a non-licensee to be matched multiple times, for 
several licensees.  
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) underline that propensity score matching and its 
ability to find appropriate matched firms, relies heavily on the data and measures used being 
appropriate to obtain useful probabilities of being treated (in this case, of being a licensee). 
Optimal results from the matching procedure are obtained when definitions and data 
measures are the same across treated observations and the control group. The choice of 
input variables is also important in the estimation of propensity scores. In this paper, we 
consider technology licensing to be an integral part of the firm’s invention and patenting 
strategy. We therefore need matching variables that convey information on these particular 
dimensions. In addition, the objective is to study the impact of licensing on the firm’s 
technological advancement. Thus, for the matching procedure we chose variables 
suggestive of the firm’s technological capability and invention strategy. This ensures, first, 
that we are comparing firms likely to perform equally well in terms of our dependent variable. 
Second, it ensures that our use of invention strategy variables in creating the matched 
sample has reduced the probability that a significant licensing variable will be attributable to 
endogeneity triggered by differences in the approach to technological advances that 
otherwise might be expressed by the license agreement variable.  
We extracted 20 possible non-licensee matches for each licensee using the 
propensity score matching procedure. Using the Thomson Research Database, we manually 
checked every firm for indications of technology licensing or patenting over a five year 
period5 from the time of the signing of the license agreement by the licensee firms. S1, 10K, 
and 8K filings often reveal whether a firm has engaged in licensing activities. Following this 
procedure, in cases where these checks revealed no evidence of licensing activity, we 
searched on Google using “License agreement” and company names, as search criteria. 
Google searches SEC filings for licensing activities. In the case that a licensee has not 
reported its licensing activities, Google search may identify them via the licensor’s filings. We 
categorized firms as non-licensees if none of these sources revealed any evidence of the 
contrary. We limited our search to one non-licensee per licensee, but ensured that the match 
survived for at least five years after the year of the signing of the license agreement. Most 
non-licensees are still in business at present. This may create some bias in the sense that 
licensees may not exhibit the same persistence in terms of survival. However, as such bias 
would go against our hypotheses, we consider that it adds strength to any supportive 
findings.  
We exploited the NBER patent data to create the matching variables. Accordingly, we 
exclude non-licensees that did not patent with the USPTO prior to signing the license 
agreement. Firms that have never patented with the USPTO may not have invention 
strategies and, therefore, may have engaged in licensing for other reasons. In addition, non-
patenting firms may rely on alternative appropriability strategies which prevent them from 
patenting, or from patenting through the USPTO. Including them in the sample might 
introduce bias in the estimations. Since we do not impose the same requirement for 
licensees, this could cause bias that would work against our hypotheses making any 
supportive results conservative.  
We excluded a small number of licensees because we were unable to find fitting 
matched non-licensees. For example, it is almost impossible to find comparable non-
licensees for companies such as Microsoft, Abbott Laboratories, Siemens, IBM, Procter and 
                                                 
5 The choice of 5 years was deliberate and is consistent with previous work on patents (e.g. Lanjouw and 
Schankerman 1999; Sampat et al. 2003), which analyzes patent quality based on number of forward citations a 
patent receives within 5 years of its application date. This is tantamount to saying that previous patenting activity 
is deemed to exhibit an effect on current outcomes (the license decision) for at least 5 years. Symmetrically, the 
decision to license a particular patent can be used to guide future decisions within a time frame of 5 years. We 
are cognizant of possible precision grinding errors. For this reason, we also conducted analyses using different 
time horizons (4 vs. 6 years): the results did not differ significantly.  
Gamble, Ericsson, and Hitachi, due to the immense size of their patent portfolios. Our final 
sample is 133 licensees and 133 non-licensees. 
 
Dependent Variables 
One of the aims of the paper is to understand how signing a license agreement helps 
to boost the invention performance of the licensee - first, in terms of invention generally, and 
second, vis-a-vis invention in the specific licensed technology. We measure these two types 
of invention performance by counting the number of patent applications within five years of 
the reference license agreement, and the number of patent applications in the same IPC 
code(s) of the licensed patent(s) within five years of the license agreement. By using the date 
of application rather than date of granting of the patent, we lower the probability that an 
invention was generated before the license agreement. However, since the updated NBER 
patent database contains only successful patent applications, our definition of invention is 
grantes USPTO patents.  
By dividing the number of patents in the technological classes contained in the 
license agreement by the general invention measure, we obtain a measure of how narrowly 
the firm invents in the licensed technology. This measure acts as the dependent variable in 
our investigation of hypotheses 3 and 4. We disregard firms that did not patent at all within 
the 5 years.6  
Our sample contains license agreements signed in 2001. Investigating inventiveness 
for the five years after the license agreement means we count patent applications up to 
2006. However, because we updated the NBER data to May 2008, applications filed before 
2006, but not granted by May 2008 may cause some underestimation of observations in later 
license agreement years. However, we do not expect this to cause serious bias in our 
estimates as we have no reasons to suspect that the patent office treats applications from 
the licensees and non-licensees differently.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
The matching procedure provides a dummy variable for studying the effect of signing 
a license agreement or not, resulting in a grouping of two equally represented observations 
of licensees and non-licensees. The benchmark is the non-licensees, leaving the estimate as 
a measure of the effect of having chosen to sign a licensee agreement.  
Hypothesis 3 suggests that firms familiar with the licensed technologies are more 
likely to concentrate their post-licensing patenting in the technological class of the contractual 
                                                 
6 We considered the possibility that leaving out licensees that did not patent subsequent to the license agreement 
would cause selection bias. Following the approach developed in Heckman (1979), we used the Inverse Mills 
Ratio as an added explanatory variable and found no indication that our results suffer from selection bias.  
agreement. As an indicator of technological familiarity with the licensed technology, we 
employ Ziedonis’s (2007) focus index. This is a measure of the share of patents granted in 
the six years prior to licensing, that are in the same IPC as the patents included in the license 
agreement of reference.  
We use the Herfindahl index to calculate the technological specialization of the firm 
prior to the license agreement using the IPC codes of the firms’ patent portfolio. This is 
based on the share of patents across technological classes. The lower the index, the less 
technologically specialized the firm and, hence, the lower the level of simplicity of the 
invention behavior.   
 
Matching Variables 
The use of matching variables has two objectives. First, it ensures that licensees and 
non-licensees are equally likely to have signed the license agreement in question. Second, it 
describes the technological capability, learning potential, invention strategy, and 
inventiveness of the firms, thereby ensuring that we are investigating comparable subjects. In 
this paper, we use five variables. First, a measure for how extensively a firm has invented 
prior to licensing-in, based on patent stock. This is measured by the logarithm of the firm’s 
number of patents. Organizations with a larger pool of potential complementary technological 
assets are more likely to license-in since they have a greater chance of successfully 
combining the acquired technology with in-house technology. In addition, based on its 
previous extensive invention performance, it is likely that the firm will invent in the future, as a 
result of path dependence in invention activities.  
Second, firms that have demonstrated an ability to introduce major inventions, 
reflected in the number of citations their inventions receive, are more likely to continue to 
pursue an invention strategy. In addition, numerous citations may also be an indicator of 
extensive network relations, which, in turn, may increase the potential for licensing activity. 
Thus, we use the average number of citations to the firm’s patents as a matching variable.   
Third, patenting frequency is quantified as the average time between patents granted 
prior to the license agreement. This is calculated as the number of years between the license 
agreement and the first patent granted, divided by the number of patents granted. Higher 
frequency is expected to increase the likelihood that the firm will patent again, and will patent 
more extensively. It also indicates the intensity of the firm’s invention strategy, pointing to 
external search behavior.  
Fourth, technological diversity is measured as the number of different IPC codes the 
firm has patented in prior to the license agreement. Firms exhibiting high technological 
breadth are considered more likely to patent in general, compared to inventing narrowly in 
the technological class specified in the license agreement. In addition, a high level of 
diversity suggest that the firm has rather extensive invention capabilities, which, in turn, may 
increase the number of potential licensing-in technologies. 
The fifth variable is based on firms’ co-patenting activities indicating openness to 
cross-organizational collaboration. cross-organizational collaboration may enhance an 
organization’s inventiveness and be indicative of the likelihood of the firm engaging in 
licensing activity. We use a prior to license agreement co-patenting dummy as measure of 
this.  
 
Control Variables 
We account for the firm’s search strategy, using the Katila and Ahuja (2002) search 
scope and search depth measures, which hark back to March’s (1991) exploration-
exploitation dichotomy. Search depth is defined as the average number of times a firm cites 
patents repeatedly in its patent applications. Search scope is defined as the proportion of 
citations in a firm’s patent applications for a particular year, that were not cited in the 
previous five years. 
The NBER dataset reports a generality index for each patent. This is based on the 
share of citations a patent receives from different technological classes. Summing up the 
squared shares produces a measure suggesting the degree to which the technology is 
applicable in multiple technological contexts (see Hall and Trajtenberg 2004 for details). We 
use the maximum generality index of the firm’s patents prior to the reference license 
agreement, as a control for the firm’s ability to produce inventions useful as inputs to multiple 
technological classes. Following Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999), firms’ technological 
complexity is measured by the average number of claims on patent grants prior to the license 
agreement. Familiar with complex technologies promotes the ability to absorb new 
knowledge and integrate it into their existing knowledge bases (Lin 2003).    
We use the NBER technological classifications as a control for differences in 
patenting activities across technologies. We use a categorical distinction to control for the 
size of the firm. The categories are: Small firms defined as less than 100 employees; 
Medium firms defined as 100-1,000 employees; and Large firms defined as firms with over 
1,000 employees. Finally, we control for geographical location by a dummy for whether the 
firm is North American or not. The assumption is that Japanese and European firms may 
exhibit lower propensities to patent at the USPTO compared to North American firms since 
their first choice may be their local patent office.  
 
Method 
The first four hypotheses (1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b) categorize invention performance as: 1) 
whether a firm produces any inventions at all; and 2) how many inventions a firm produces. 
We follow Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) and apply a hurdle/two-part model to investigate a 
two-stage process. In this paper, the first stage relates to the ability of the firm to become an 
inventor – to overcome the barriers to invention. The second stage involves how extensively 
the firm is able to invent. Adopting this approach, we investigate first what drives the 
likelihood of producing any inventions at all, and second, once a firm exhibits patenting 
activity, what drives the number of inventions a firm produces.  
The hurdle model involves two density estimations. The first estimation explains the 
observations of a positive number of inventions determined by a density, f1(.), so that 
Pr[y>0]=f1(y). The second is a truncated density function estimation explaining the number of 
inventions, disregarding zero observations. This may be written as f2(y|y>0)=f2(y)/(1-f2(0)). 
The hurdle model multiplies f2(y|y>0) with (1-f1(0)) to ensure that the probabilities of the 
outcomes sum to unity. The hurdle model is reduced to the standard count model in cases 
where f1(.)=f2(.). We follow McDowell (2003) and use a complementary log-logistic 
specification for the first part and a truncated Poisson specification to model the positive 
outcomes in the second part. In the two regression specifications we employ the same 
variables as regressors. The Huber-White sandwich estimation technique is used to correct 
standard errors for possible heteroskedasticity.  
To test hypotheses 3 and 4, we develop a model specification that explores the type 
of licensee, which, subsequent to the license agreement, tends to invent narrowly in the 
licensed technologies. This is done by examining only the inventive licensees and regressing 
the explanatory variables used in the previous regressions against the number of inventions 
in the licensed technologies relative to the total number of inventions introduced by these 
licensees. This measure is truncated at zero for those observations that did not invent in the 
licensed technologies, and at 1 for those subjects that only invent in the licensed 
technologies. We use the two-limit Tobit regression specification to model this, as prescribed 
by Tobin (1958).  
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
The Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables are presented in Table 1 
reveal that the analysis is unlikely to suffer from multicollinearity. This is confirmed by a 
variance inflation factor analysis. Table 1 shows that approximately 59% of firms engaged in 
some patenting activity within the five years following the license agreement, and about 24% 
of firms patented in the IPC codes of the patents included in the reference license 
agreement.  
***INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
Table 2 presents the distribution of observations across the three categorical 
variables included in our model. The sample is split between licensees and non-licensees. In 
terms of firm size, Table 2 shows that the sample contains a majority of small firms. 
However, taking the skewness of the population size distribution into consideration, it is 
evident that licensing-in is more likely to be a large firm strategy. Although the size variable is 
not used in the matching procedure, there is an overwhelming similarity between the licensee 
and non-licensee samples in terms of firm size distribution. Table 2 also shows that there are 
geographical differences between licensees and non-licensees. In our sample the relative 
number of firms categorized as Non-North American is higher for non-licensees. This may be 
a by-product of licensing being more widely used as an integrated activity in the invention 
strategies of North American firms, making it more difficult to find a North-American match 
that is also a non-licensee. This is also consistent with evidence on the markets for 
technology which suggests that American firms lead in terms of technology exchange, 
compared to the rest of the world (e.g. OECD 2007).7 Also, and not surprisingly, we observe 
an equal number of licensees and non-licensees in the six different technological classes 
attributable to the technological class used in the exact matching procedure. However, we 
can also see that a substantial number of observations patent primarily in the “Drugs and 
Medical” and the “Chemicals” technological classes.   
***INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
The propensity score matching procedure matches not on regressors, but on 
estimated likelihoods given regressors. We cannot be certain, therefore, that the matching 
variables are distributed equally across the licensee and non-licensee samples. We ran a 
probit regression using the licensee dummy as a dependent variable, and propensity score 
matching variables and the technological class dummies used in the exact matching 
procedure as explanatory variables. We found no significance, and a pseudo R-square only 
marginally above 0. Also, the Chi-square statistic suggests a 98% likelihood of all parameter 
estimates to be equal to zero, indicating that the matching procedure was successful in 
finding matching firms based on these input variables. These results also suggest that any 
significance found in the hurdle models with respect to the matching variables can be 
attributed to within-group correlations rather than between-group differences. 
 
Licensing and the Invention Performance of the Licensee 
The results from the two hurdle models are reported in Table 3. The columns to the 
left refer to the regression for inventions in general, where the dependent variable is a 
                                                 
7 According to the 2007 OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook (OECD 2007: 12) “Royalty receipts 
from outward licensing have been estimated at 6.0%, 5.7% and 3.1% of total R&D spending for US, Japanese 
and European firms, respectively, suggesting that technology licensing markets are better developed in the 
United States than elsewhere”.  
dummy for whether the firm introduced any inventions at all (complementary log-logistic 
regression) and the total number of patents after the firm invented at least one (truncated 
Poisson). The columns on the right show the regression results for inventions in the licensed 
technology with a similar set-up, based on inventions in the same technological class as that 
of the licensed technology.  
***INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b are strongly endorsed by the results. The licensee variable is 
highly significant in explaining both the likelihood of inventing and the number of inventions 
introduced after the signing of the reference license agreement. Our analysis also provides 
support for hypothesis 2a, by suggesting that licensing-in is affiliated to a higher chance of 
introducing new inventions in the licensed technology. We find no support for hypothesis 2b. 
Once non-licensees have overcome the hurdle of inventing in the technology acquired by the 
licensees, they seem to be equally well equipped to invent extensively in this particular 
technology.  
These regressions provide evidence that licensing agreements allow licensees to 
enjoy spill-over effects from the licensed technology and the licensor in the form of 
knowledge flow and learning, facilitating patenting in the licensed technology as we as in 
other technology classes than those specified in the license agreement.  
Among the other results presented in Table 3, we highlight the following as being 
integral to our analysis. We find that search depth and search scope increase the firm’s 
likelihood of introducing new inventions in general, but that search scope, at best, has only a 
weak effect on raising the probability of inventing in the licensed technology. However, the 
results do suggest that firms employing a search depth strategy are hampered in terms of the 
number of inventions filed in the licensed technological class, while firms employing a search 
scope strategy engage in greater invention activity in general, and are more active in 
invention in the technology specified in the license agreement. Technological specialization 
seems to increase the likelihood of inventing generally, as well as becoming successful in 
producing at least one invention in the IPC codes covered in the reference license 
agreement. The firm’s patent stock prior to the license agreement increases the extent of 
invention regardless of whether it is invention generally or invention in the licensed 
technology. Furthermore, the regression results suggest that technological experience 
hampers the extent of invention in general.      
 
Specialization, Familiarity and Narrow Invention Strategy 
Table 4 presents the results of the Two-Limit Tobit regression investigating whether 
particular types of licensees tend to invent relatively more often in the IPC codes of the 
licensed technology. Table 4 reveals that 98 of the 133 licensees did invent in the five years 
after the license agreement. It also shows that 38 of the licensees did not invent in the 
licensed technology at all, and that 13 licensees invented only in that technological class.  
***INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE*** 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 suggest that technologically specialized licensees, and licensees 
familiar with the licensed technologies, tend to be more likely to exploit the narrowly specified 
technologies covered in the license agreement and to search the invention landscape in the 
area of the licensed technologies. We provide support for both these hypotheses in finding 
significant positive estimates for both specialization and familiarity.  
The coefficients of our two dummies for technological classes – namely the “Drugs 
and Medical” and the “Electric and Electronics” – are also significant. This suggests that 
inventions in these technology classes are relatively less used for general technological 
advancement than technologies licensed in the chemical technology class (benchmark 
category).      
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper was motivated in part by the recent trends in firms’ approaches to increase 
their invention rate. Firms are adopting more open models of innovation, thereby taking 
advantage of the opportunities that the markets for technology may present, to foster and 
unlock the potential of firms’ internal R&D efforts. In particular, firms are embracing inward 
technology licensing as a means to realize their invention objectives. Indeed, licensing has 
become one of the most visible mechanisms of knowledge transfer among firms and one of 
the more accessible means of tapping into the knowledge bases of other firms.  
Licensing-in strategies are traditionally considered to be driven by the licensee’s 
desire to get rapid access to proven/mature technology. However, such practices are 
increasingly being recognized as strategic and for the pursuit of other goals, such as 
technological learning, which, in turn, leads to the development of new technological 
capabilities. To the best of our knowledge, very few studies have attempted to address 
whether and to what extent licensing-in generates new technological advances. This is 
despite the increasing empirical evidence that licensees gain competitive advantage, and 
even achieve technological leadership, by leveraging and exploiting the learning 
opportunities that licensing practices enable.  
This paper fills a gap in the existing knowledge by providing strong quantitative 
evidence of licensing functioning as a catalyst for developing and introducing new inventions. 
The results suggest not only that licensing increases the likelihood of introducing new 
inventions, but also that it increases the number of inventions that the licensee is able to 
introduce. Thus, licensing promotes invention activities in general, enabling the firm to enter 
technology fields beyond those included in the license agreement. However, we have also 
shown that licensing increases the likelihood of introducing a new patent in the technological 
class embedded in the license agreement.  
In addition, our results suggest that there are particular antecedents that drive the 
licensee to focus on the technological class specified in the license agreement. 
Technological specialization and familiarity with the licensed technology promote focused 
invention activities. Licensees with high levels of specialization and/or technology familiarity 
tend to invent primarily in the regions of the technological landscape of the licensed 
technology. Accordingly, diversified firms and licensees relatively unfamiliar with the licensed 
technologies tend to explore the invention landscape more widely than the license 
agreement technology focus. This indicates that there is a need to focus on learning patterns 
and their related invention and innovation effects when deciding about licensing-in. This 
observation is highly relevant to a better understanding of the path dimensions of dynamic 
capabilities (see e.g. Teece et al. 1997), an aspect that has received far less attention than, 
for example, resource constellations, and the managerial and organizational processes 
involved in changes to the firm’s resource base over time. Our empirical observations 
indicate that licensing-in not only is a means for deepening already existing knowledge sets, 
but also induce new search patterns, which ultimately may lead to a broadening of the firm’s 
patenting activities and new combinations of existing and new knowledge. Hence, technology 
licensing could reduce the path dependency of established firms and trigger the pursuit of 
new invention endeavors. This is in line with the suggestions in Granstrand (1998), which 
stress that technological opportunities can be created through the combination and cross-
fertilization of old and new technologies, and that combinatorial possibilities grow 
exponentially when new technologies are added to the firm’s existing technological base. 
Thus, the introduction of new technologies via licensing-in constitutes a potentially important 
vehicle for generating new opportunities for invention by inducing new search patterns and 
technology combinations. This may lead to a widening of the technological trajectory that 
influences the firm’s strategic maneuvering space. The different search patterns triggered by 
different licensing approaches can also be important for understanding the flexibility of a 
firm’s resource base, an aspect seen as important for firms to remain competitive over time 
(see e.g. Wernerfelt (1984) and Sanchez (1995)). Thus the inherent flexibility of a resource 
base, which, in technology-based businesses, can play a significant role in challenging 
relentlessly dynamic and entrepreneurial markets, may be affected by licensing-in activities. 
These activities may enable firms to open up the box of learning opportunities for diverse or 
more consistent uses of their knowledge bases.  
 
Limitations 
This paper suffers from a number of limitations. Technology licensing-in does not 
necessarily need to be an integrated part of a invention strategy, but may be pursued for 
other reasons. Among other motives, firms may license a given technology as a part of a 
broader R&D partnership or cross-licensing agreement, or simply because they are forced to 
do so as they have previously infringed a licensor’s property rights (settlement agreement). 
We are aware of these motives, but since we are concerned in this paper only with 
technology exchange agreements - which imply a one-way technology/intellectual property 
rights transfer, from licensor to licensee - we included only those transactions that were 
originally filed by the parties as (pure) licensing or assignment agreements. Thus, we 
excluded all other transactions that refer to R&D collaboration, cross-licensing, settlement 
agreements, and also technology purchases and merger plans8 that were incorrectly listed 
under the heading “Transaction/Patent Licenses” in the original dataset. Nevertheless, we 
are not able to separate agreements that were signed as a way to pre-empt a violation of a 
licensor’s intellectual property rights, from those that are an integral part of a licensee’s 
invention activity. Given this, the positive correlation between licensing-in and invention 
performance may need to be re-evaluated as it points to an unobserved omitted variable that 
may influence invention performance and promote the decision to license a given 
technology. However, we consider this case to be unlikely in context of our dataset. We 
believe that firms engaging in license agreements with the sole purpose of avoiding legal 
litigation would previously have developed the technology they considered to be in danger of 
violating the intellectual property rights of the licensor. Hence, we would expect the licensee, 
in this case, to apply for a patent immediately after signing the license agreement. We 
studied the time it took for a licensee to apply for a new patent after having licensed the 
technology and found it to be on average 109 months after signing the license agreement. 
This long time period suggests that at least the majority of our licensees do not license as a 
way to avoid legal litigation.   
The invention performance of the firm is a time-dependent issue. The cross-sectional 
nature of our sample limits the scope of the analysis. It may exclude some relevant insights 
on the dynamics of the licensing-in decision and internal R&D efforts over time. We look only 
at the effects of a specific decision to license-in on the future inventive outcome of the firm. 
However, decisions should be framed within the overall strategy of the firm, which is 
developed and modified across the years. Thus, our analysis is limited in the sense that we 
assume that the invention strategy of the firm is fixed across time. However, our licensees’ 
                                                 
8 Original documents downloaded from the SEC website generally indicate type of transaction –license, 
settlement agreement, or the like – in headings. We were careful to check for any information suggesting that the 
contract referred to another type of agreement than a technology/patent license.  
and non-licensees’ approaches to technological change may diverge at the point of licensing 
beyond signing a license agreement. We have no immediate way of controlling for this 
potential source of bias in the analysis.    
The sample of license agreements under investigation all provide information on the 
technology embedded in the publicly available contract. However, in some circumstances, 
secrecy may be of major importance to the licensee. Revealing the contents of license 
agreement may signal the technological strategy of the licensee, thereby providing 
competitors with information that may be disadvantageous in the invention race. 
Disregarding license agreements whose contents are not disclosed may lead to a bias in our 
estimates. However, we contend that this potential bias would go against our primary 
hypotheses. Consequently, our results should be considered conservative estimates of the 
relationship between invention performance and taking the decision to license-in a 
technology.   
In addition, it is possible that our matching procedure suffers from unobserved 
heterogeneity and hence may produce bias due to omitted variables. Our results rest on the 
specification of the matching procedure. The propensity score-matching procedure has been 
criticized for bias based on the number of variables used in the matching procedure. We did 
find some indications that our licensees and non-licensees matched on other dimensions 
when we considered the control and explanatory variables suggesting the matching process 
to be robust.   
 
Future Research, 
The results of this study indicate clearly that licensing puts the licensee in a favorable 
position compared to a matched non-licensee, in terms of ex-post licensing inventive 
performance. The license agreement provides potential learning which extends beyond the 
specifications in the agreement, for instance, a patent application, and which drives the 
inventive performance of the licensee. We hypothesize that signing a license agreement also 
opens up other channels for information flow between licensee and licensor, creating a 
mutually beneficial collaborative scenario. According to the literature, this applies mostly to 
patent licensing for a very obvious reason. As patents encompass knowledge that is formally 
codified and legally enforced, they make licensors more likely to provide the more tacit part 
of technological knowledge (know-how) which is relevant to understanding and fruitful 
exploitation of the licensed technology. Follow-up research might investigate whether these 
channels also help firms to introduce inventions more quickly by accelerating the speed at 
which they can progress in the innovation landscape, identify opportunities, and overcome 
innovation barriers. Future work might also look more deeply at the dynamics of cross-
organizational collaboration induced by licensing and whether it contributes extensively to 
our understanding of the role played by formal agreements compared to informal channels of 
information and knowledge flow. By disentangling the relative importance of these two, we 
would achieve a scholarly grasp of the true relationship between signing a license agreement 
and invention performance. We would then understand better whether license agreements 
are direct drivers of technological change or have an indirect effect driven by the formation of 
informal network ties that promote knowledge sharing and thereby increase the number of 
potential new combinations of existing knowledge bodies.  
Our study has also investigated the antecedents to a firm’s engaging in a licensing 
agreement in terms of benefiting from the technology it licenses-in. However, given that 
formal and informal linkages in the formation of channels of information and knowledge 
between licensee and licensor are extremely important, we propose that future research 
should investigate the nature of the relationship between licensee and licensor. This is 
important in two dimensions. First, the overlap between competences and capabilities of 
licensees and licensors defines the scope of potential knowledge combinations and resulting 
invention opportunities. Second, following the arguments of Li, Eden, Hitt and Ireland (2008), 
partner selection is of great importance in the formation of R&D alliances. Trust between 
partners, and protection of intellectual property rights play a major role in defining the 
boundaries of the information flow between the parties involved. Similarly, the knowledge 
and information flows between licensee and licensor may suffer in the presence of mistrust, 
and restrict inventiveness based on the license agreement. A related stream of research 
could focus on improving our understanding of the role of certain contractual clauses in the 
partner selection.    
Finally, we propose that future work should investigate whether firms experienced in 
cross-organizational collaboration are also better equipped to draw advantages from 
licensing activities. Experience may help firms to select the best partners and also develop 
their abilities to manage partnerships, maximizing the benefits in terms of knowledge and 
information flows. Indeed, the facility to define the boundaries of a collaborative partnership 
is an acquired capability that involves defining the intellectual property rights of traded and 
produced technological assets as well as setting the scope of the license agreement in terms 
of knowledge sharing. The right settings may facilitate a more relaxed and more fruitful 
contractual partnership by promoting trust and mutual understanding. Repeated technology 
licensing partnerships, for instance, may provide suggestions about the aspects that facilitate 
and promote a mutually beneficial contractual relationship, leading to a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics of technology licensing.  
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Variable Mean s.d.  1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  13.  14.  15.  16.  17.  18.  19
 1. Patent Activity      0.59      0.49
 2. Nunmber of Patents     10.65     52.77 0.17
 3. Patent Activity in Licensed technology      0.24      0.43 0.47 0.27
 4. Number of Patents in Licensed Technology      2.92     16.70 0.15 0.85 0.31
 5. Share of Patents in licensed Technology
.  20.
b      0.22      0.35 . 0.04 0.78 0.21
 6. Licensee      0.50      0.50 0.30 0.17 0.49 0.17 0.42
 7. Familiarity      0.16      0.31 0.05 -0.01 0.30 0.07 0.49 0.12
 8. Technological Specialization      0.54      0.39 0.07 -0.11 0.08 -0.05 0.31 -0.29 0.16
 9. Patent Stock      1.20      1.12 0.17 0.54 0.19 0.39 -0.10 0.07 -0.10 -0.34
 10. Average Number of Cites      9.69     14.96 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.11
 11. Average Time Between Patents     21.58     34.04 -0.15 -0.09 -0.23 -0.09 -0.17 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.10 0.08
 12. Technological Diversity      3.05     15.00 0.09 0.74 0.14 0.40 -0.04 0.08 -0.06 -0.14 0.65 -0.02 -0.07
 13. Technological Collaborator      0.06      0.25 0.06 0.37 0.03 0.31 -0.09 0.11 0.04 -0.09 0.33 -0.01 0.03 0.33
 14. Search Depth      0.42      1.46 0.19 0.14 0.29 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.20 0.04 -0.06 0.13 0.11
 15. Search Scope      0.32      0.42 0.24 0.14 0.20 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.15 -0.03 -0.21 0.06 0.05 0.24
 16. Technological Experience     59.06     75.71 0.09 0.21 0.04 0.12 -0.11 0.17 -0.16 -0.34 0.70 0.06 0.42 0.39 0.25 0.04 0.02
 17. Patent Stock Generality      0.55      0.39 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.07 -0.16 -0.11 -0.06 -0.20 0.57 0.31 0.02 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.39
 18. Average Number of Claims      0.80      2.43 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.11 0.18 0.21 -0.09 0.34 -0.12 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 0.17 -0.19 0.07
 19. Medium Sized Firm      0.28      0.45 0.06 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.06 0.10 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.04
 20. Large Sized Firm      0.16      0.37 0.15 0.24 -0.05 0.18 -0.20 -0.04 -0.11 -0.09 0.26 -0.04 0.09 0.23 0.10 -0.00 0.15 0.27 0.05 -0.00 -0.2
 21. North American Firm      0.86      0.35 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.20 0.24 0.03 -0.10 0.01 0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.24 0.07 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.0
a The data have 266 observation. Coefficients greater in magnitude than 0.12 are significant at the 0.05 level
7
1 -0.09
b Numbers associated with this variable are only based on 149 observations
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa
TABLE 1 
 TABLE 2 
Firm Size, Country of Residence and Primary Technological Class of Non-
licensees and Licensees 
Variable Licensees Non-Licensee Total
Firm Size
Small 73 77 150
Medium 41 33 74
Large 19 23 42
Geography
North American 103 125 228
Not north American 30 8 38
Primary Technological Class
Chemicals 34 34 68
Computers and Communications 13 13 26
Drugs and Medical 48 48 96
Electrical and Eletronics 12 12 24
Mechanical 6 6 12
Others 20 20 40
Total 133 133 266
 
 
 
 TABLE 3 
Determinants of general and targeted invention performance, results of 
hurdle modelsa
General Invention Regression Invention in Licensed Technology Regression
Complementary Complementary
Log-logistic Truncated Poisson Log-logistic Truncated Poisson
Explanatory Varibales
Licensee 1.408 *** [0.252] 1.136 *** [0.282] 3.625 *** [0.865] -0.329 [0.641]
Familiarity 0.194 [0.323] -0.124 [0.446] 2.174 *** [0.459] -0.462 [0.672]
Technological Specialization 1.632 *** [0.329] -0.441 [0.379] 2.000 *** [0.564] 1.670 ** [0.792]
Matching Variables
Patent Stock 0.517 ** [0.254] 0.610 *** [0.145] 0.818 ** [0.324] 0.710 ** [0.298]
Average Number of Cites 0.022 *** [0.008] 0.011 * [0.006] 0.001 [0.011] -0.010 [0.010]
Average T ime Between Patents -0.011 ** [0.004] -0.004 [0.008] -0.021 * [0.011] -0.023 [0.019]
Technological Diversity -0.029 *** [0.008] 0.002 [0.004] -0.005 [0.009] -0.010 [0.007]
Technological Collaborator 0.106 [0.526] 0.293 [0.334] -1.629 ** [0.719] 2.235 *** [0.651]
Control Variables
Search Depth 0.694 *** [0.256] -0.094 [0.064] 0.111 [0.128] -0.246 *** [0.088]
Search Scope 0.518 ** [0.245] 0.942 *** [0.223] 0.661 * [0.391] 1.747 *** [0.514]
Technological Experience 0.002 [0.003] -0.006 *** [0.002] -0.003 [0.004] 0.000 [0.003]
Patent Stock Generality -0.515 [0.355] -0.513 [0.318] -0.962 [0.634] -1.857 ** [0.775]
Average Number of Claims -0.151 *** [0.053] -0.040 [0.061] -0.046 [0.069] 0.115 [0.094]
Firm Size
Large 0.855 *** [0.295] 0.909 *** [0.305] -0.133 [0.525] -0.030 [0.779]
Medium 0.205 [0.240] 0.680 ** [0.288] 0.332 [0.350] 0.494 [0.604]
Small Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark
North American Firm 0.194 [0.327] 0.693 [0.630] 0.418 [0.929] 12.649 .b
Primary Technology Dummies
Computers and Communications -0.097 [0.349] 0.107 [0.509] -0.691 [0.664] -0.115 [1.342]
Drugs and Medical 0.114 [0.268] 0.207 [0.281] 0.218 [0.414] 0.452 [0.843]
Electrical and Eletronics 0.052 [0.436] 0.344 [0.279] 0.628 [0.623] 0.189 [0.643]
Mechanical 0.628 [0.514] -0.064 [0.525] 0.749 [0.816] -0.637 [0.847]
Others 0.072 [0.331] -0.013 [0.398] 1.208 ** [0.574] -0.209 [0.809]
Chemicals Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark
Constant -2.584 *** [0.527] -0.197 [0.632] -6.470 *** [1.145] -12.459 *** [0.963]
Number of Observations 266 157 266 64
Log-Likelihood 129.074 -950.969 -68.060 -325.627
Wald Chi-Square 76.452 *** 7995.502 *** 84.804 *** 1560.044 ***
Pseudo R-Square 0.808 0.705
*: p<.1, **: p<.05, ***: p<.01
bVery few no n-No rth American Firms  pa tents  in the  IP C co des  o f the  licens e  agreement o f re fe rence . Co ns equently the  table  exhibits  a  mis ing 
s tandard devia tio n fo r this  va riable  and infla tes  its  es tmia te  and the  inte rcept. Leaving it o ut revea ls  tha t no ne  o f the  o ther es tima tes  a re  influenced by 
this .
 
 
 TABLE 4 
Two Limit Tobit Models of Share of Inventions in Licensed Technology 
 
Explanatory Varibales
Familiarity 0.769 *** [0.208]
Technological Specialization 1.024 *** [0.278]
Matching Variables
Patent Stock 0.065 [0.131]
Average Number of Cites -0.003 [0.005]
Average T ime Between Patents -0.006 * [0.003]
Technological Diversity 0.003 [0.003]
Technological Collaborator -0.401 ** [0.193]
Control Variables
Search Depth -0.045 * [0.024]
Search Scope 0.152 [0.128]
Technological Experience -0.000 [0.001]
Patent Stock Generality -0.067 [0.248]
Average Number of Claims 0.005 [0.035]
Firm Size
Large -0.090 [0.200]
Medium 0.119 [0.131]
Small Benchmark
North American Firm -0.131 [0.202]
Primary Technology Dummies
Computers and Communications -0.328 [0.256]
Drugs and Medical 0.306 ** [0.148]
Electrical and Eletronics 0.434 ** [0.202]
Mechanical 0.263 [0.247]
Others 0.204 [0.203]
Chemicals Benchmark
Constant -0.528 ** [0.245]
Sigma Constant 0.414 *** [0.046]
Number of Observations 98
Number of Left Truncated Observations 38
Number of Right Truncated Observations 13
Log Likelihood -56.626
F-Statistics 4.646 ***
Pseudo R-Square 0.404
Note: *: p<.1, **: p<.05, ***: p<.01
Share of Inventions in 
Licensed Technology 
Regression
 
 
